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THE POWER OF THE SENATE TO AMEND A TREATY

T

HE recent refusal of the Senate to ratify eight general arbitration treaties which the President had concluded with
Austria-Hungary, Switzerland, Great Britain, France, Portugal,
Germany, Mexico,' and Norway and Sweden, until, against the protest of the President, it had modified them materially by amendment,
has called public attention to the treaty-making power, and has
raised the question as to whether or not any of that power is vested
in the Senate. The power and authority to establish, regulate, and
maintain relations between this country and foreign nations has been
delegated without reservation or restriction to the general government, no check or control over the exercise of the power having
been retained by the states, or by the people. Under the articles
of confederation, a very considerable part of this sovereign power
was retained by the states. Article VI provides: "No state, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled shall
send any embassy to or receive any embassy from or enter into any
conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with, any King, Prince, or
State.
"No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation,
or alliance Whatever between them, without the consent of the
Uhited States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the
purposes for which the same is to be entered into' and how long it
shall continue.
"No state shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere
with any stipulation in treaties entered into by the United States, in
Congress assembled, with any King, Prince, or State, in pursuance.
of any treaties already proposed by Congtess, to the Courts of
France and Spain."
Article IX declared that, "The United States in Congress assem-
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bled shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth
article-of sending and receiving embassadors-entering into
treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall
be made whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall
be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners,
as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever."
The division of sovereignty thus created by the articles of confederation, between the general government and the several states
proved of no advantage to either, and was a source of acknowledged weakness. The members of the general convention which
framed our present constitution were unanimously agreed that full
control over foreign affairs should be given to the general government. There was some conflict of opinion as to whom such powers
should be confided, but none as to its being an unlimited and unrestricted grant of authority.- The plan suggested by Hamilton was
finally adopted. Article II which enumerates the powers and duties
of the President provides in section 2, that: "He shall have power
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
judges'of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by law." Section 3, provides that
the President "shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers" and "shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed and
shall commission all the officers of the United States."
In the due exercise of those powers, the President concluded those
general arbitration treaties and submitted them to the Senate for
its approval and concurrence. It does not appear that the Senate
took any action upon the treaties in the form in which they were
presented. It proceeded immediately to amend, and rewrite them,
and after the treaties had been amended, they were ratified as
amended. The original arbitration treaties recited that the contracting governments being "Signatories of the Convention for the
pacific settlement of International disputes, concluded at the Hague,
July 29, 1899," and "taking into consideration that by Article 19
of that Convention, the high contracting parties have reserved to
themselves the right of concluding agreements with a view to refer2 Elliot's Debates, pp. 368-369-379.

POWER OF THE SENATE TO AMEND A TREATY

429

ring to arbitration, all questions which they shall consider possible
to submit to such treatment," have concluded the following arrangements:
Article i.-Differences which may arise of a legal nature, or
relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two
contracting parties, and which it may not have been possible to settle
by diplomacy, shall be referred to the permanent Court of Arbitration, established at the Hague by the Convention of July 29, i899;
provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the
independence, or the honor of the two contracting states, and do not
concern the interests of third parties.
Article 2.-In each individual case, the high contracting parties,
before appealing to the permanent Court of Arbitration shall conclude a special agreement defining clearly the matter in dispute, the
scope of the powers of the arbitrators, and the periods to be fixed
for the formation of the arbitral tribunal, and the several stages of
the procedure.
Article 3.-The present convention shall be ratified by the .President of the United States of America, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate thereof; it shall become effective on the day
of such ratification, and shall remain in force for the period of five
years thereafter.
The Senate amendment to these treaties (there was only one),
struck out in section 2, the word "agreement" and inserted in its
stead "treaty."
Under the treaties as submitted, the President
alone could make an agreement to submit certain questions to arbitration without first obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate;
under the treaties as amended no agreement to submit any question
whatever could be submitted unless such agreement was put in the
form of a treaty and ratified by the Senate.
Before considering the power of the Senate to amend a treaty,
let us examine the question in dispute between the President and
the Senate over this particular amendment to these treaties. As
we have seen the treaties negotiated by the President, gave him
authority to submit questions that could not be adjusted by
diplomacy. It is conceded that he has no such power under the
Constitution and that it must be given him, if at all, by treaty, and
since no treaty can be made except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, that that body has the unquestioned right to give
or withhold from him that power. The Senate had an undoubted
right to refuse to clothe the President with any such authority.
Whether or not their action was wise or not is a political question,
one of policy, merely. Does their action safeguard in any manner
the interests, rights, and liberties of the American people, or does
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it tend to retard the submission of questions in dispute to arbitration and thus endanger the peace of the world?
It will be noticed that the agreements provided for. in the second
section of those treaties are by the express terms of section i, limited to "differences which may arise of a legal nature and which it
may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy," and that all
questions "affecting 'the vital interests, the independence or the
honor of the contracting parties and the interests of third persons,"
are expressly excepted. The language used clearly imports a desire
on the part of the contracting parties that when any controversy
which is a proper subject for settlement through the agency of
diplomacy, cannot be adjusted by that means, then such question,
but no other, shall be submitted to arbitration. If this is the true
meaning and scope of those treaties they do not in the slightest
manner abridge the powers and prerogatives of the Senate over any
matter properly and exclusively within the domain of the treaty
making power, since they simply provide that such questions only
shall be submitted which the President in the first instance might by
diplomacy adjust. When any controversy arises between this
nation and a foreign power, which is a proper subject for diplomatic
discussion and adjustment if the President and such foreign power
can arrive at a mutual understanding, the matter is so adjusted,
and the advice and the consent of the Senate are not necessary; if no
mutual understanding can be reached by the President and such
foreign power, then the President has exhausted his constitutional
authority. As we have seen the President is not given by the Constitution power to submit such questions at that stage of the controversy to any court of arbitration, without having first, by a
special or a general treaty, obtained the consent of the Senate. It
was to give him that additional power that those treaties were negotiated. The Senate evidently regarded the power as one that it
was dangerous, or at least, inexpedient, to confer upon the President.
One of the reasons assigned in justification of the Senate's action
is that any such agreement made by the President would have the
force and effect of a treaty, and that for the Senate to permit the
President to enter into such an agreement without its advice and
consent, would be a surrender of powers and prerogatives, conferred
upon that body. Unquestionably every treaty is an agreement, but
the converse of that proposition is not true that every agreement
is a treaty, or that no agreement can be made between nations
unless it is put in the form of a treaty and duly ratified and
exchanged. The adjustment of any question in dispute between
this nation and another by diplomacy is an agreement and quite
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as binding upon the contracting parties as a treaty, and the violations of such an agreement might be a good and ample justification for a declaration of war. The reason given, therefore, is
without force unless those treaties permitted the President to submit
some question to arbitration which involves matters that ought
not to be adjusted except by treaty. In other words does artqcle
2 of these arbitration treaties which permits an agreement to be
made to submit a large variety of questions to arbitration, all of
which may be settled and adjusted without any treaty, solely by
diplomacy, and also provides that no such agreement shall include
certain other questions, give the President any authority directly or
by implication to enter into an agreement to submit any question
whatever which belongs exclusively to the domain of a treaty? No
one has pointed out a possible question of that kind. No effort was
made on the part of the Senate to- correct any omission of that kind.
What the Senate did in effect was to declare that they would not
ratify any general arbitration treaty, and they have made the negotiation and ratification of such a treaty impossible.
Having pointed out the nature of the controversy between the
Senate and the President and the purpose and effect of the Senate's
amendment, let us consider the right of the Senate to amend a
treaty in any particular whatever. What provision of the Constitution confers upon the Senate directly or inferentially such power
and authority? If it possesses that power it has been specifically or
inferentially conferred by Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution
quoted above. That section gives the President expressly the power
to make treaties. The authority, power or prerogative to advise the
President and to concur is given to the Senate. The implied powers
conferred upon the President and upon the Senate are limited to
those which are necessary and essential to enable each to exercise the
power specifically granted. The power to advise and concur does
not include the power to negotiate a treaty since the Senate cannot
take the first step in that direction. It has no authority to communicate with or to receive any communication from any foreign government. Congress, the Senate and House united, possess no such
authority. In January, 1877, Congress passed two joint resolutions,
congratulating the Republic of Pretoria in South Africa and the
Argentine Republic in South America, upon their establishment of
a republican form of government. One of the resolutions directed
the Secretary of State to acknowledge the receipt of a dispatch from
the Argentine Republic and the other directed him to communicate
to the Republic of Pretoria, the high appreciation of Congress for
the action of that Republic. -President Grant vetoed both resolu-
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tions, on the ground that under the Constitution the President was
the proper agent to communicate with foreign powers and that it
was unconstitutional for Congress to hold any such communication.
2
No attempt was made to pass either resolution over the veto.
To every treaty made between the United States and a foreign
power there are two parties, and in negotiating such treaty each is
represented by an accredited agent. The President, and not the
Senate, is the agent of the United States, and necessarily her sole
agent, since neither the Senate, nor the Senate and House together,
Congress, can communicate with such foreign power. The Senate
of course may advise the President during the negotiation, and that
course is often followed. Indeed the charge is sometimes made that
when the Senate has been consulted, its advice received and followed, a treaty drawn in harmony with that advice fails of ratification. The failure of the Senate to ratify a treaty negotiated
under those circumstances, is not unconstitutional. The constitutional requirement is that the treaty is to be made by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. The Senate may therefore advse
and then refuse to consent to a treaty made in accordance with its
advice. The Constitution may contemplate that the Senate shall be
governed by the advice which it gives, but such implied requirement
is not mandatory. Not until after the treaty has been finally concluded by the President on the part of the United States and the
foreign power, not until it has been made, written, does it come
before the Senate for its consideration. Since the Senate cannot
communicate with a foreign power, a party to the treaty, no change
can be made in that document by the Senate because the consent of
the foreign power to make such a change is necessary. For the
Senate to arrogate to itself any such power is futile and an inexcusable attempt to exercise a power expressly conferred by the
United States upon the President.
If a treaty negotiated by the President and submitted to the Senate
for ratification is in fact rewritten by the Senate,-if it can be
changed in part it may be changed altogether-and if such treaty
so rewritten is afterward approved by the President and the foreign
power, and thus becomes a valid treaty, who made it? The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, or, the
Senate by and with the approval of the President and the foreign
power? And if a treaty so rewritten is afterward accepted by the
high contracting parties as modified must it bd again submitted to
the Senate to be ratified?
That section of the Constitution which confers upon the President
2

Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Richardson, Vol. V, p. 430.
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power to make treaties confers upon him also authority to make
appointments, and each of those powers is to be exercised by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The power, authority,
privilege, or prerogative conferred upon the Senate to bestow
advice and to give or withhold its consent both as to appointments
and to treaties, is clothed in the very same words, and those words
are found in the same article of the Constitution in the same section
and in the same sentence, and there is nothing in any other provision of the Constitution which modifies in the slightest degree the
power, privilege, authority, or prerogative, so conferred in each case.
If, therefore, when a treaty is submitted to the Senate, it may change
it in form and in substance by striking out words, sentences, or
paragraphs, and inserting other words, sentences and paragraphs,
having a different meaning and purport, then when an appointment
is under consideration it may follow the same course in exercising
a like power or prerogative. Consequently when the President sends
to the Senate for confirmation the names of several persons
appointed by him, to fill certain offices designated, it may proceed to
strike out the name of some appointee and insert that of another
person, or, being persuaded that the appointees and the offices are
mismated, it may rectify the presidential blunder in that regard, by -a
careful "and judicious substitution and transposition of men and
offices and then, having thus advised the President as to what he
ought to have been done, and acting upon the. maxim that what ought
to have been done, will be regarded as having been done, confirm
the appointments as corrected and perfected. It has never been suggested by' anyone .that the Senate possesses any such power, nor has
anyone, so far as we are aware, ever suggested any reason why the
power to ratify a treaty is more ample in any direction than the
power to approve an appointment to office. There are certain objections to permitting the Senate to amend a treaty that do not apply
with like force to its substituting some other office for the one
selected by the President for his appointee. In case of a treaty there
is a third party, the foreign nation, who has not and cannot authorize
the Senate to make any amendment. But in the case of appointments there are only two parties, the President and the Senate, and
they can communicate with each other dt any moment. There is,
however, one objection to the Senate's amending a treaty that applies
with equal force to its substituting some other person, for the
appointee named or some other office for the office designated. If
the Senate should make any such substitution, and the President
should submit to the dictation, the appointment would be made by
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the Senate with the approval of the President and not by the President with the concurrence of the Senate.
The power to make treaties and to make appointments are executive powers and under the English Constitution belong exclusively to the Crown. They were given to the executive department
by our Constitution, but as a check upon their exercise a limited
supervision was conferred upon the Senate, itself -a fragnnent, or the
corner stone, of the legislative departmefit. No authority, as we
have seen, was given expressly or by implication to the Senate to
exercise either one of those powers.
The Constitution confers
exclusively upon Congress legislative powers. Article I, Section i,
provides: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives." But the President is given a supervisory power over legislation which very closely corresponds to the
supervisory power given the Senate over the executive power to
make treaties and appointments. The power to advise Congress
with regard to legislation is expressly given to the President. He is
required to "recommend to their consideration such measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient." (Art. II, Sec. 2). And no
bill passed by Congress shall become a law until it has been submitted to the President and approved by him, or, if disapproved,
shall be passed over his veto. (Art. I, Sec. 7). Thus the power to
legislate given exclusively to Congress is to be exercised by and
with the advice and consent of the President. The fact that the
President's advice may be disregarded and his veto overridden, does
not enlarge or diminish the President's power to advise or to veto,
nor does that fact enlarge or diminish the implied powers that are
conferred upon the President incident to the power to advise and to
disapprove. Whatever the President might do if his veto was final,
he may now do. The power of Congress to pass a bill disapproved
does not impair in any respect the authority of the President to
exercise that power. It has to do solely with the effect of his veto.
Does anyone claim, or has anyone ever claimed, during the hundred and odd years that the Constitution has been in force, that the
President has any authority whatever, when a bill is submitted to
him for approval to change, modify or amend such bill in any particular, and then to approve the bill so amended? But if the Senate
may amend a treaty it is asked to ratify why may not the President
amend a bill he is asked to approve? As we have pointed out the
fact that the bill is not approved by the President and must be
returned and may notwithstanding his disapproval become a law, has
no Bearing upon the President's authority. If the Constitution had
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provided that in case a treaty submitted to the Senate for approval
was not approved, it might. with the Senate's objection, be submitted
to the House of Representatives for approval, such a provision would
not enlarge or diminish the authority of the Senate to advise and
consent. Whatever the Senate may now lawfully do, in giving or
withholding its consent, it might do if its consent was not absolutely
necessary to the ratification of a treaty.
The power to amend implies that the individual or body possessing
that power is clothed with authority to make a legal and valid change
in the instrument to be amended, There is no pretense that the
Senate can make any legal or valid alteration in a treaty. Unquestionably the Senate may suggest amendments; may advise the President that unless the treaty is changed and modified it will not be
ratified. Such a course is an exercise of the power conferred upon
the Senate. The power to suggest amendments differs widely and
radically from the power to amend. The suggestion is an admission
that the person making it has no power to make the amendment.
We have examined quite fully the power of the Senate to amend
for the sole purpose of showing conclusively, not only that it possessed no such power but also for the purpose of showing that it has
no authority whatever to exercise in that manner the power given it
to approve or disapprove a treaty. There is no claim on the part of
the Senate that it has any authority to amend, that it can make any
valid change in a treaty which will bind either the President or the
foreign power. The course of pretending to amend is adopted on
its part for the two-fold purpose of defeating the treaty submitted
and indicating at the same time the form of a treaty it would be
willing to ratify. It may be asked what objection can there be to
the Senate's "playing" at amending a treaty if the sole effect of its
sport is merely to defeat the treaty, since its right to withhold its
consent is unquestioned. There are many objections, some of which
we have already indicated.
The Constitution gives the President power to make treaties by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President has
the right to have the very treaty made by him approved or rejected.
When the Senate amends no action is taken upon the treaty in the
form submitted and the Constitution is thereby violated in spirit if
not in the letter.
In assuming to amend a treaty, the Senate exercises a power not
delegated to the Senate and expressly conferred upon the President.
It is dangerous to permit any official or any department of the government to play at usurpation. It is a sport not to be countenanced
nor tolerated by a free people.
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The course pursued by the Senate relieves it from the responsibility incident to the approval or rejection of a treaty. If the Senate
disapproves a treaty by amendment it may pretend, by ratifying the
treaty as amended, that the Senate favors the treaty. This is illustrated by a remark recently made by a Senator (Carmack) in the
debate upon the Navy Appropriation Bill. The Senator commenting
upon what he characterized as a disposition on the part of the President to intermeddle with the business of the other departments of the
government, said: "He has thrown the arbitration treaties into the
fire because the Senate insisted upon its constitutional powers and
prerogatives." This is a direct and specific charge that the failure of
those treaties was due to the action of the President; that they were
destroyed, not in the Senate chamber, but at the other end of the
avenue, in the White House.
Pretending to change and modify a treaty may result in the defeat
of a treaty that otherwise would be approved. It enables a bare
maj9rity to make changes solely for the purpose of protecting some
local or sectional interest. This is especially true of every reciprocity treaty. The Senate has many members of great ability and
of profound learning. The members naturally have great respect,
often well founded, for h member's opinion upon any political or
legal question. A new member is not supposed to be able to impart
any information worthy of attention before he has breathed the air
of the Senate chamber for at least one year. That particular custom
has not in the past proved a source of any great calamity. The
period of the novitiate might indeed in many cases be-extended with
profit to the Senate and to the entire satisfaction of the people.
There has for some time been a growing custom, understanding or
agreement that due regard and consideration for a Senator's personal feelings ought to prevent the confirmation of any appointment
made by the President, if the appointee is personanon grata to either
of the Senators from the state to which such appointment will be
credited. That unwritten law, designated senatorial courtesy,
requires and demands that, if necessary, the public welfare shall be
sacrificed to gratify a personal peek or prejudice. So far as appointments are concerned, no confirmation is possible which will violate
senatorial courtesy. This is so well understood by the public that
when Senator Quarles was recently nominated for a judicial position
in Wisconsin, and it was discovered that his appointment could not
be confirmed until after March .4th, when his successor, Governor
LaFollette, would be a member of the Senate, that the public press
announced, as a fact that went without saying, that if Governor
LaFollette objected the appointment would not be confirmed. If
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any appointment is objected to on personal grounds, the nominee's
character, ability, and qualifications, count for nothing. They are not
considered. A person possessing the legal learning and ability of
Chief Justice Marshall if appointed to fill the most inferior judicial
office in the gift of the President, could not be confirmed if at any
time in the past he had said or done anything to offend one of the
Senators from his state and the affront had been remembered and
had not been forgiven.
The law of senatorial courtesy embraces the ratification of treaties
as well as the approval of appointments. It is not true, parhaps,
that no treaty can be ratified which is objected to by some Senator
on the ground that it is offensive to him personally. That is due,
however, in a great measure, to the difficulty the Senator has in
establishing the fact that it is personally offensive. When such an
objection is made to an appointee, the proofs are immediately closed.
The Senator having announced his state of mind as to that appointee,
a fact exclusively within his own knowledge, there remains no foundation upon which a doubt of the fact car. rest. In the case of a
treaty the personal objection is not to the treaty itself, the inanimate
offspring of wood pulp and some by-product of coal tar, but to the
anticipated effect the treaty will have upon some personal, or local
interest, which furnishes the Senator, or his family, or his relatives,
or his henchmen with food, clothing, or votes. Whether or not such
treaty will have the evil effect feared is, however, a matter of opinion,
judgment. Senatorial courtesy does not, as yet, require a Senator
to foreswear his duty to the people that some Senator's mere whim
may be gratified. The Senator's fellow members may disagree with
the objector as to the actual results which will flow from the practical operation of the treaty, or, they may agree with him in part, or,
they may admit that as to one local interest the treaty will have the
evil effects predicted but that the losses so inflicted will be more than
counterbalanced by benefits conferred upon other local interests, or,
they may believe that the evils predicted and which will follow are
so insignificant, compared with the benefits which will accrue to the
people at large, that they do not merit consideration, and consequently, if the Senate performed its constitutional function of
approving or disapproving a treaty, in the manner contemplated by
the Constitution, and voted to concur or reject the treaty, in the form
in which it was submitted, this law of senatorial courtesy might in
many cases be disregarded. The moment, however, that the Senate
assumes to exercise the powers belonging to the President exclusively and to rewrite the treaty for his approval, it subjects itself to
the mercy of any member, invoking the aid of senatorial courtesy
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and insisting upon the adoption of some amendment which he claims
is essential to make the treaty acceptable to some borough, hamlet,
or local interest, in his "neck of the woods." Now the slogan,
"love me, love my dog," rallies to his support political friend and
political foe. Judging from the course taken in the Senate during
the last few years, in regard to certain reciprocity treaties, the time
will come, if the hour has not already struck, when no reciprocity
treaty can be negotiated by the President which will be concurred in
by the Senate before amjendments have thoroughly impregnated it
with the smell of codfish or some other pungent local odor.
This
T
exercise by the Senate of its constitutional power to reject a
treaty by pursuing a method ultra vires, illegal, void, and in form the
usurpation of power conferred upon the President, is producing
results naturally incident to any and every usurpation of authority.
It has already produced in the senatorial mind, apparently, the
impression, feeling, or belief, that to the Senate belongs of right the
power to supervise and control the President's methods of conducting and managing the foreign and international affairs of the
country; that he may not enforce the law of nations for the protection of the rights of American citizens in any foreign country without having first obtained the advice and consent of the Senate. The
Senate has not thus far, claimed the right to take the first steps in
negotiating a treaty, but it has in effect announced, that when the
time arrives in the negotiation when the Senate must be consulted,
it will then, ex parte, prepare a full and complete draft of a treaty
which it will submit to the President and the foreign power as its
ultimatum. It also seizes upon that-opportunity to send for all correspondence in regard to the treaty or any other foreign transaction,
and enters into a general discussion of our international affairs. It
does this as a Senate, not as the upper house of Congress. The duty
of enforcing the laws of nations rests upon the President, not upon
Congress, much less upon the *Senate. If this usurpation of power
upon the part of the Senate to intermeddle with executive duty and
to interfere with the President in his enforcement of the laws of
ziations continues, the time is close at hand when our foreign affairs,
while nominally under the management of the President will in fact
be under the control of the Senate, and the President will perform
his duties as its confidential clerk-trusted amanuensis. Within the
last few days a Senator (Bacon) introduced a resolution, inquiring
whether or not the President could, without first obtaining the advice
and consent of the Senate, enter into any arrangement or agreement
with any foreign power under which this government might be permitted to collect any portion of the revenues of such foreign power
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and apply them in payment of claims 'due to our citizens. We may
naturally expect that some other Senator will soon inquire whether
the President has the power without first obtaining the -advice and
consent of the Senate to order any war ship to any foreign port, for
the purpose of safeguarding the rights of American citizens.
When the treaty of San Domingo was under consideration a
Senator (Teller) introduced a communication from some junta in
Paris, claiming legally to represent that unfortunate country and
protesting against the ratification of the treaty. It was written in
French and in that condition was comparatively innocuous, but the
Senator, with malice aforethought, had had it translated into English
and in that digestible form it was served up, dishussed, and devoured.
When only a few remnants remained, some Senator objected to the
communication being received and considered on the ground that the
Senate could not receive a communication from any foreign power.
The Senator introducing the communication admitted that it could
not be received for "consideration," but thought it might be for "discussion." The distinction between discussing a question and considering it, is not on the surface. The presiding officer did not
instantly grasp the distinction and the objection was sustained. The
Senators folded their napkins, the cloth was removed, and the
crumbs shaken outside the chamber for those birds of passage, the
reporters. Another step in that direction will permit and sanction
an invitation to a foreign representative to give from his place in the
diplomatic gallery of the Senate his views upon any question in
dispute between his nation and the United 'States, not for consideration, but for discussion merely.
At this "moment a British passport furnishes its possessor far
better protection in any land which is under the control of the
barbarian, the semi-civilized or the revolutionist, than does an
American passport. The revolutionist, the semi-civilized and' the
barbarian hesitates and refrains from depriving a British subject of
life, liberty or property, not through love of right, or respect for
any particular Englishman, but on account of a well grounded fear
that he will have to pay back four fold the value of the fruits of his
wrongdoing as soon as steam and electricity can hurry a British
agent to demand satisfaction. An American passport will be of no
practical value to the holder when the enforcement of his rights
under the law of nations depends in part upon the dilatory and
sluggish movements of a body of men in -which each of the ninetyfive or more, members can speak ad libitum, some of whom have
shown the physical ability to talk through an entire quarter of the
moon. The Senate might consider with profit that incident in the
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life of St. Paul when he struck terror to the hearts of his jailors by
asking them the simple question: "Is it lawful to scourge a Roman
citizen ?"
It does not 'ppear that any member of the Constitutional Convention, when the treaty making power was under consideration,
intimated that there was the slightest danger that the Senate would
ever, under pretext of giving advice, and consenting to the making
of a treaty, usurp the power itself. Mr. Gladstone has said, that
our Constitution "is the most wonderful work ever struck off in a
given time, by the brain and purpose! of man." That is a scripture
measure of praise "heaped up and running over." Much of it is
well merited. The framers of the Constitution were not, however,
either prophets or seers, but just honest patriots, hard headed,
broad minded, and fearless in the discharge of duty. Some of the
most carefully considered provisions of the Constitution have proved
utterly worthless. Careful and deliberate thought was given by the
Convention to several methods of electing the President. The
scheme of having him chosen by an electoral college was finally
adopted. It was stone dead in less than one-third of a century. A
written Constitution prevented the body being cremated and so the
remains were embalmed and the poor, dry, grinning mummy is
compelled, once every four years, to perform mechanically and
automatically, its constitutional functions. The debates inthe Convention, and the essays in the Federalist upon the electoral college
are now valuable principally for the clear and forcible proof they
afford, of the utter fallibility and worthlessness of the judgment of
the wisest and most learned, when it does not rest upon the solid
and enduring foundation of actual experience.
The discussion of the treaty making power of the Constitution
discloses the fact that the dangers which the framers sought to
guard against were for the most part imaginary.. All were agreed
that the President was the proper person to exercise the power, if
he could be trusted not to use it to overthrow the Republic, or to
acquire a personal fortune. 3 A monarchy built upon the ruins of
the Republic was the bogy man who disturbed their waking dreams.
To prevent the President from turning traitor or boodler the Senate
was given a check upon his power to make treaties and appointments. And to still further curb his influence and prevent him from
corrupting a portion of the Senate, a two-thirds majority of that
body was required to ratify a treaty. The power to declare war
was given to Congress. Congress could be trusted, and therefore
Congress, by a bare majority vote, could plunge the nation into war.
3Federalist, Nos. 64-75.
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But the only condition upon which peace could be restored was to
obtain the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present.
It was felt that the evils of war would necessarily only continue
for a season and the blessings of peace should not be purchased at
the price of giving the President an opportunity to seize a sceptre
and a crown. Everyone felt that the usurpation of power on the
part of a single executive was a present and a continuing danger.
No one anticipated that there was any occasion for the slightest
apprehension that the Senate would ever mar any provision of the
Constitution. The result shows how far afield their fears led them
astray. The President is elected by Electors pro forma, by the
people in fact, and the people are given an opportunity once in
every four years" to condemn or approve his official conduct. He
is held directly responsible for the faithful administration of the
Executive Department, and there has never been any danger of any
usurpation of authority on his part. The Senate never dies, is
invulnerable to the ballot, indifferent to public opinion. Its conduct
never comes before the people for approval or condemnation. Onethird of its members are elected every two years, which renews
its physical life but makes no change in its methods and purposes.
It is natural that a body composed of able and ambitious men, not
responsible for its official conduct, either to the people, or to any
other department of the government, should steadily and persistently endeavor to increase its power and importance. The result is
that a power given the Senate to prevent the President from overturning the Govenrnment and destroying the liberties of the people
threatens now to seriously hamper the President in the exercise of
his executive powers to the detriment of the people's interests at
home and to the imminent peril of the rights of American citizens
abroad.
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